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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

23 FEB 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Presidential Authority to Call Units of the Selected Reserve
to Active Duty Involuntarily

The President has requested legislation giving him the authority to call to active duty up to 50,000 members of the Selected Reserve for not longer than 90 days. The purpose of the legislation is to enhance the President's flexibility in dealing with situations not warranting the declaration of a national emergency. If approved, it will increase the credibility of the Selected Reserve and allow extension of the Total Force concepts into situations short of full mobilization. We should be prepared to use the authority promptly after approval; therefore, it is important to accomplish our planning.

Accordingly, the Services should review their Case 4/1 resource allocations and force structures to identify the changes that could result from approval of the legislation. Two scenarios are enclosed demonstrating the possible uses of the authority. The scenarios are consistent with the planning scenarios in the Planning, Programming Guidance Memorandum and should be used as the primary basis for identifying the resource and force structure impacts of the legislation. However, the Services may propose other scenarios deemed appropriate. For each scenario, the Services should identify:

- the number and type reserve units needed
- the required readiness of the units
- the resource implications

The Joint Staff should evaluate the tentative allocations made in the example scenarios and identify other scenarios for the use of the authority.

The results of your preliminary analysis should be provided to ASD(M&RA) and ASD(PA&E) by April 15, 1976, and may be refined in your POM submittals in May.



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Scenario I

Peacekeeping in the Middle East

War breaks out between the Arab countries and Israel (D-Day). After two weeks of intense combat Israel requires resupply of tanks, self-propelled artillery, armored personnel carriers, tactical aircraft, and ammunition. The U.S. began to airlift supplies shortly after D-Day but the major effort begins on D+15.

After 14 days of combat Israel has gained an advantage which threatens the Egyptian government. The Soviet Union threatens intervention. Egypt and Israel request U.S. combat forces to stabilize the situation. On D+15 the U.S. begins deployment of three divisions and support to sustain combat operations for 60 days. The U.S. Air Force positions tactical aircraft to be capable of supporting the deployed divisions. The U.S. Navy positions forces in the Mediterranean Sea in order to protect sea-lanes to the deployed divisions and the supporting air units.

By D+60 the military situation between Egypt and Israel has stabilized but political tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union remain high. Soviet forces remain on alert. U.S. forces stay in the Middle East through D+120. Between D+120 and D+150 the political situation stabilizes and U.S. forces are returned to CONUS by D+150.

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


Enclosure 1

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SCENARIO I CALL-UP AUTHORITY
(Manpower 000's)



The above chart shows the allocation of the call-up authority among the Services. Each bar shows the call-up date, number of reservists activated, and the duration of the activation.



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Scenario II

NATO Pre-Mobilization

Relations with the Soviet Union have been deteriorating. SALT and MBFR negotiations have failed. U.S. intelligence indicates the Soviet Union is improving the readiness of her forces: manning levels of some units have increased, a few logistics units have been activated, and several airborne divisions are on alert. These indicators are not sufficient to convince the President to mobilize U.S. forces but he instructs the Secretary of Defense to use the call-up authority to improve the U.S. defense posture.

The Secretary of Defense activates critical Reserve support units and Reserve combat units that round out selected Active Army units to full wartime structure. He also calls to active duty reserve strategic lift units.

Within 30 days after the call-up of reserve units the Soviet Union mobilizes followed by U.S. mobilization seven days later. After 23 days of U.S. mobilization conventional war with the Soviet Union breaks out in the central region.



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
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Enclosure 2

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SCENARIO II CALL-UP AUTHORITY
(Manpower 000's)



The above chart shows the allocation of the call-up authority among the Services. Each bar shows the call-up date, number of reservists activated, and the duration of the activation.



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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PROGRAM ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: 50,000 Call-up Authority - ACTION MEMORANDUM

This memorandum forwards for your signature a tasking memorandum requiring the Services to consider the implications of the proposed legislation which would give the President the authority to activate 50,000 members of the Selected Reserves for not more than 90 days.

Over the last several years the Department of Defense has sought to improve the readiness of the Reserve Components and increase reliance on them in a Case 4/1 scenario. Although much progress has been made, our efforts might have been more fruitful if the Services had confidence that (1) the Reserves would be activated in contingency situations, and (2) the political leaders would declare a state of emergency in time for the Reserves to be activated before any D-Day in Europe.

To improve the credibility of the Reserves as reliable contributors in the Total Force, last year the Department submitted a legislative proposal which would give the President the authority to call to active duty not more than 50,000 members of the Selected Reserve for not longer than 90 days. The authority would be used under conditions short of a declaration of war or national emergency as declared by the President or Congress. Hearings were held last year but no action was taken. The proposal was resubmitted this year and the Senate recently approved the legislation by a 77-0 vote. Now the proposal goes to the House.

If we are to use this authority properly we must plan for its use and consider its resource implications. This requires more detailed guidance to the Services than has heretofore been considered appropriate for either the DPPG or PPGM.

The enclosed memorandum to the Service Secretaries and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasks them to do the analysis needed to adjust our plans and evaluate the current allocation of resources. The guidance

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consists of two planning scenarios, each with a tentative distribution of the 50,000 authority among the Services. The Services should identify for each scenario, and for any others considered appropriate, the type units needed, required unit availability times, and the resource implications.

ASD(M&RA) concurs with the proposed memorandum. The General Counsel confirms that the proposed planning scenarios are consistent with the authority contained in the bill as approved by the Senate.

Recommend you sign the enclosed memorandum.

SIGNED

Leonard Sullivan, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Program Analysis & Evaluation

Enclosure

Coordination: J. S. Ahearne 2/3/76 ASD(M&RA) Richard A. Wiley 2/2/76 GENERAL COUNSEL

Prepared by PAT HILLIER, X-76408

